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Abstract: The product/process dis-
tinction with regards to “argument” 
has a longstanding history and foun-
dational role in argumentation the-
ory. I shall argue that, regardless of 
one’s chosen ontology of arguments, 
arguments are not the product of 
some process of arguing. Hence, 
appeal to the distinction is distorting 
the very organizational foundations 
of argumentation theory and should 
be abandoned.  
 
Resumé: La distinction proces-
sus/produit appliquée aux arguments 
joue un rôle de fondement de la 
théorie de l’argumentation depuis 
longtemps. Quelle que soit 
l’ontologie des arguments qu’on 
adopte, je soutiens que les argu-
ments ne sont pas le produit d’un 
processus d’argumentation.  Donc 
l’usage de cette distinction déforme 
le fondement organisationnel de la 
théorie d’argumentation, et par con-
séquent, on devrait abandonner cette 
distinction 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent work, Ralph Johnson raises several problems for the 
adequacy of the Logic/Rhetoric/Dialectic trichotomy and for its 
alleged basis—the argument as product/process/procedure 
trichotomy. My concern here is not with Johnson’s problems—
rather it is with what Johnson leaves unchallenged. While John-
son ultimately has some reservations about argument as proce-
dure, he leaves the product/process distinction untouched. He 
writes: “The distinction between product and process seems to 
me fairly secure. It has a longstanding history here and in other 
disciplines. In logic, for instance, the term ‘inference’ is under-
stood as ambiguous as between the process of drawing an infer-
ence and the inference that results from that process” (Johnson 
2009, p. 3). 
 Despite its longstanding history and foundational role in 
argumentation theory, I am not so confident about the security 
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of the product/process distinction, at least as it applies to “ar-
gument” or even “inference”. In what follows, I shall focus on 
“argument”. In section 2, I shall first articulate the conditions 
required for “argument” to be subject to the product/process 
ambiguity, and then, in sections 3 and 4, argue that, regardless 
of whether one thinks arguments are composed of acts or propo-
sitions or sentences, not all of the conditions are met. Finally, in 
section 5, I shall point out some ways in which argumentation 
theorists have been led astray by relying on this alleged ambigu-
ity.  
 
 
2. The process/product distinction and argument 
 
In his chapter on ambiguity, just after giving an example of how 
an argument can go wrong by failing to distinguish the action 
sense of a word from the result sense of a word, Max Black 
writes: “A great many words exhibit a similar fluctuation be-
tween emphasis upon a process (a doing something) and an as-
sociated product (the result of an activity)”(Black 1946, p. 177). 
The general consensus, among argumentation theorists at least, 
is that “argument” is such a word. Though Black himself does 
not acknowledge that he thinks “argument” is such a word, his 
own discussion of argument evinces at least part of such an am-
biguity. On the one hand, in his glossary, he defines an argu-
ment as follows: “Argument. A process of reasoning in which 
the truth of some proposition (the conclusion) is shown, or al-
leged to be shown, to depend upon the truth of others (the prem-
ises)”(Black 1946, p. 379). But in the main body of his text he 
writes: “We have seen that the elements out of which that com-
plex object which we call an argument is constructed are state-
ments (or more precisely, propositions); and we have noticed 
that the propositions are arranged or related to one another in a 
certain way”(Black 1946, p. 18). On the one hand, Black defines 
argument as a process of reasoning, but on the other he calls an 
argument a complex object constructed of statements or proposi-
tions. 
 That there are words subject to the process/product ambi-
guity is not a matter of dispute. Black’s own examples of “sci-
ence” and “education” are perfectly legitimate. But is “argu-
ment” subject to the ambiguity? To say that a word is subject to 
the process/product ambiguity is to say that (a) there is a sense 
of the word that refers to an activity; (b) there is a sense of the 
word that refers to an object or thing; and (c) the object or thing 
is in some sense the result or outcome of the activity. For exam-
ple, we could use “science” to describe the activity of doing cer-
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tain sorts of investigations or we could use “science” to de-
scribe the results or outcomes of those investigations. But while 
“argument” satisfies conditions (a) and (b), it is not at all clear 
that it satisfies condition (c) as so many seem to suppose.1 
 That “argument” satisfies conditions (a) and (b) is also not 
a matter of contention. Just compare—“It is better to engage in 
argument than in intimidation” and “Peter Unger’s argument for 
skepticism consists of three propositions.” But merely satisfying 
conditions (a) and (b) is not enough to warrant talking about ar-
guments as process and arguments as product. Satisfying condi-
tions (a) and (b) merely warrants talking about the activity of 
arguing2 on the one hand and arguments as objects on the other. 
Indeed, no one ought to dispute that there are acts of arguing, as 
opposed to acts of explaining or prophesying or poetry reading, 
on the one hand, and groups of propositions, sentences, state-
ments or utterances, on the other. But for the product/process 
ambiguity to obtain, the object must in some sense be the prod-
uct of the activity—does this hold for “argument”?   
Many theorists write as if it does. Here are but a few examples: 
 
O’ Keefe and other rhetoricians think that argument in the sec-
ond sense is given too much importance, especially by logicians 
and philosophers, and that more emphasis should be placed on 
the process of arguing, rather than on something produced in 
that process. (Levi 2000, p. 59 ) 
 
The term ‘argument’ can be used to refer either to the process 
or to the product of that process. (Johnson 2000, p. 12) 
 
Logic helps us to understand and evaluate arguments as prod-
ucts people create when they argue. (Wenzel 1990, p. 9) 
 
An argument is produced by the activity of arguing and arguing 
is something people do.  (Fogelin 1985, p. 2) 
 
                                                        1 Perhaps “argumentation” as some people use it does satisfy the three condi-
tions. But then, if I am correct in what follows, that just shows that “argu-
ment” and “argumentation” are not always interchangeable. Regardless, for 
any who view “argumentation” as interchangeable with “argument”, then the 
following discussion applies to “argumentation” as well. 2 Though most of my examples will involve individuals making arguments, 
there is nothing in my formulation that restricts activities to the acts of single 
individuals. Groups debating or having an argument are also instances of the 
activity of arguing. But since group arguing is at least in part comprised of 
individuals making arguments to others in the group, if the distinction fails in 
the individual case it will fail in the group case. 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Not all theorists are willing to be constrained by the prod-
uct/process locutions. For example, Alvin Goldman writes: 
 
The term ‘argument’ will be used here for the product, or per-
haps content, of argumentation, usually, for a set of sentences, 
or a set of propositions that might be expressed by means of 
such sentences. One member of such a set is a conclusion and 
the other members (possibly null) are premises. The elements of              
an argument might be printed, uttered, or merely thought. ‘Ar-
gumentation’, by contrast, will refer to the process or activity of 
producing or deploying such a complex object. A process of ar-
gumentation can be purely mental, in which case it is ‘infer-
ence’, or it can be overt and public. (Goldman 2003, p. 52) 
 
Note that while Goldman does incorporate the possibility that 
argumentation is the process or activity of producing arguments, 
he also allows for the possibility that arguments might be the 
content of argumentation or what is deployed in argumentation.  
 Despite Goldman’s willingness to allow for the possibility 
that arguments might be related to acts of arguing in some other 
manner than product of the process, the norm in argumentation 
theory is to treat arguments-as-objects as the product of the 
process of argument-as-activity. I shall, however, argue in the 
next sections, that even Goldman’s weaker position concedes 
too much, for arguments are just not the products of the process 
of arguing.  
 
 
3. Products as propositions? 
 
Suppose you hold that arguments-as-objects are sets of proposi-
tions. Should you accept that these sets of propositions are the 
product of acts of arguing? No. Propositions are abstract objects, 
either eternal or atemporal, and not the subject of production. 
Hence, whatever is the product of acts of arguing, if there is 
such a product, it is not the set of propositions that is an argu-
ment. 
 But perhaps someone might object that while the proposi-
tions are not created, perhaps the sets or particular groupings of 
them are—in other words the argument, i.e., the group of propo-
sitions does not exist as an argument until someone groups them 
that way and that way of grouping happens as a result of the ac-
tivity of arguing. 
 Short reply: If the group that is the argument just is a set, 
say the ordered set of a set of propositions and another proposi-
tion, then, since the set is itself an abstract object and exists in-
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dependently of anyone thinking of it or creating it, the group 
is not produced by the act of arguing. 
 Longer reply: Suppose one holds that the entity that is the 
argument is not the set of propositions, but rather the group of 
propositions that results via the activity of some agent. One 
might wonder whether this group just is the set of propositions 
even if it is the activity of the agent that has made us become 
aware of the set (and even though one may not think of the en-
tity one is now aware of as a set or an ordered set). But assume 
for the moment there is a distinct entity that is the result of this 
grouping activity. So according to the current proposal, an ar-
gument is a group of propositions that gets grouped as part of 
the activity of arguing. 
Assume, for the moment, that arguments are groups of proposi-
tions. Is the act of arguing t he only means of performing the 
grouping activity that produces arguments? No. Suppose Sally 
asks Roy to give her an example of an argument comprised 
solely of existential generalizations. Roy slyly responds with, 
“Some arguments are composed solely of existential generaliza-
tions, so some arguments are composed solely of existential 
generalizations.” While an act of example giving has occurred, 
an act of arguing has not. (Roy need not be trying to convince 
Sally of anything. Sally may have no doubts that such arguments 
exist and merely be testing Roy or expecting Roy to generate an 
ingenious example). At the same time, Roy has satisfied Sally’s 
request for an example of an argument. The grouping of propo-
sitions that makes an argument come into existence has occurred 
even though an act of arguing has not. Hence, acts of arguing 
are, at the very least, not the only means of grouping proposi-
tions to produce arguments. 
 Are groupings of propositions even mostly the result of 
acts of arguing?  No. Imagine that I am verbally expressing the 
arguments of this paper to an audience. When I argue that “ar-
gument” is not a process/product word, I may be making my 
audience aware of various arguments via my speech acts, which 
would certainly constitute acts of arguing—but I am certainly 
not making myself aware of these arguments. I was aware of 
these arguments well before I presented them or wrote them 
down. Also, while many acts of reflection, imagination, follow-
ing through implications, etc. occurred, as well as considerable 
reasoning about everything from word choice, sentence order, 
possible objections and possible consequences, in the production 
of these arguments, no obvious acts of arguing, even with my-
self, occurred. But if my arguments exist prior to my using them 
here to argue and if the groupings happened by some means oth-
er than arguing with myself, which I am pretty sure they did, 
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then my arguments, as groupings of propositions, are not the 
products of acts of arguing. 
 My arguments are not special in this regard. Most argu-
ments are already known, even if not fully or with sufficient 
clarity, to those who use them to argue. In other words, assum-
ing that arguments are groupings of propositions, the arguer has 
already grouped the propositions into an argument prior to en-
gaging in the act of arguing. But if arguments in general exist 
prior to their use and if the grouping in general happens by some 
means other than self-arguing, then arguments are not, in most 
cases, the products of acts of arguing.  
 Are arguments as propositions ever the result of acts of 
arguing?  Perhaps there are cases of spontaneous arguing in 
which the arguer has no idea what his or her own argument is 
until he or she is done arguing. I cannot immediately rule out the 
possibility of such cases. Nor, however, can I produce any clear 
examples of such spontaneous arguments. Until such examples 
are forthcoming, we should remain skeptical that there are any 
such cases and so remain skeptical that arguments as groups of 
propositions are the product of acts of arguing. Also, even if 
there are some examples of these sorts of cases, surely these 
sorts of cases are not the norm. Nor, given a general concern 
with improving the quality of one’s arguments or increasing the 
forethought one puts into one’s arguments, do we want these 
sort of cases to be the norm. But if these sorts of cases are not 
the norm, if they exist at all, then argumentation theory should 
not have a fundamental organizing principle that presupposes 
these sorts of cases.  
 Note that these objections work even if one has a view of 
propositions or abstract objects such that they are the sorts of 
entities that can be created by human activity. Even if proposi-
tions, or sets of propositions, are created by us, in the vast ma-
jority of cases (and perhaps all cases), the propositions or sets of 
propositions are created prior to being used to argue. But then 
arguments, as sets or groups of propositions are not, in the vast 
majority (and perhaps all) cases, the products of acts of arguing. 
 
 
4. Products as sentences? Speech acts? 
 
Suppose one takes arguments to be composed of sentences 
rather than propositions. Presumably there are two choices—
sentence types or sentence tokens. Neither option, I strongly 
suspect, will do as an adequate theory of arguments-as-objects, 
but arguing that claim is a different paper. Regardless, even 
supposing that one of these options will work as a theory of ar-
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guments-as-objects, neither option supports the view that 
such objects are the product of the process of arguing. Sentence 
types, quite straightforwardly, are abstract objects that are not 
the subject of production, but rather instantiation. Sentence to-
kens, on the other hand, either exist prior to the acts of arguing 
or are a component of the act of arguing rather than the product 
of the act of arguing.  
 Consider for example the sentence tokens that exist on this 
very page. Those sentence tokens came into existence long be-
fore being spoken aloud or read here. If my act of arguing oc-
curs when the sentences are spoken aloud to an audience or read 
here, then the sentence tokens exist prior to the act of arguing. 
Hence, the sentence tokens are not the product of the act of ar-
guing. But perhaps my act of arguing occurred when I first 
wrote the sentences down. Or perhaps the auditory argument is 
composed of not the tokens on this page, but the auditory sen-
tence tokens that come into existence when I present this argu-
ment verbally. In either case the sentence tokens are not prior to 
the act of arguing. Nor are they the product of it either. The au-
ditory sentence tokens are part of the very speech acts that are 
the act of arguing that occurs when presenting this argument 
orally. But if they are part of the act of arguing, then they are not 
the product of the act of arguing. Similarly, if my act of writing 
the sentence tokens down is my act of arguing, then the sentence 
tokens are not the product of the act of arguing, rather the pro-
duction of the sentence tokens constitutes the act of arguing.  
 This latter point also reveals the problem if we suppose 
that arguments are composed of utterances, or statements, or 
speech acts. While, unlike propositions or sentences, the utter-
ances, or statements, or speech acts cannot exist prior to the act 
of arguing, it still makes no sense to say that the utterances, or 
statements, or speech acts are the product of the acts of arguing. 
The statements, or utterances, or speech acts currently being 
made just are the acts of stating or uttering that constitute the 
current act of arguing. If I were not to make those statements, or 
utterances, or speech acts in the proper context or order there 
would be no act of arguing. Hence, taking arguments to be com-
posed of statements, or utterances, or speech acts does not sup-
port the claim that arguments are the products of the process of 
arguing.3 
 The only option left is that the act of arguing somehow 
occurs prior to the writing or uttering of the sentence tokens. But                                                         3 Of course “statement” or “utterance” also turn out to be ambiguous, since 
they could refer not to the act of uttering or stating, but to the sentence (or 
proposition) uttered or stated, in which case the arguments deployed in the 
first two cases come into play again. 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then the act of arguing must be a mental act of the arguer. I 
have already suggested that while many acts of reflection and 
imagnation may have occurred prior to the writing of my argu-
ments (which on the current hypothesis are composed of sen-
tence tokens), it is not at all clear that any acts of arguing with 
myself occurred in the production of these sentence tokens. Nor 
do I think that other arguers are engaging in self-argument in 
order to produce the arguments they make for their audiences. 
But suppose I am mistaken about my mental life (and the mental 
life of other arguers). Suppose there are acts of arguing with 
myself that produce these sentence tokens. It is not, however, 
these mental acts of arguing with myself that the many argu-
mentation theorists are referring to by the “argument-as-
process”. When numerous argumentation theorists enjoin us to 
focus more on the “process of arguing” rather than on the 
“product of arguing”, surely they are enjoining us to focus on 
the overt acts of arguing that happen in our everyday lives, (such 
as the politician arguing before Congress (or Parliament) that a 
bill should or should not be adopted, or the letter to the editor 
arguing that the publication got something wrong, etc.), rather 
than sets of propositions abstracted from any context. It is the 
overt observable acts, in their context of occurrence, that are 
supposed to be the focus of our study—not the inaccessible 
mental acts of the arguer.4 
 Note that the problems for “argument” with regards to the 
product/process distinction, also apply to Johnson’s “inference” 
example. There is no doubt the act of inferring—but what is the 
thing that is the inference that is allegedly the result of the act of 
inferring? The inference could just be the thing inferred, i.e., the 
conclusion, but it is hard to see how the conclusion is the prod-
uct of the act of inferring rather than just the endpoint reached 
via the act of inferring. One may be aware of one proposition or 
sentence and aware of another, and then come to realize that the                                                         4 One might point  to Dale Hample’s papers,  “A Cognitive View of Argu‐ment”  or  “A  Third  Perspective  on  Argument”  to  suggest  that  at  least some theorists have argued for a focus on the relevant cognitive events. Admittedly,  in  the  first  paper,  Hample  claims  that  the  message’s  only function  is  to  “stimulate  the  production  of  an  argument  within  some‐one’s  cognitive  system”(Hample  1980,  p.  152),  though  even  here  he  is more  interested  in  the  productive  contribution  of  the  receiver  rather than the stimulus provided by the message.    In  the second paper, how‐ever, he  focuses on the arguer and argues that “argument‐as‐cognition” is what generates public acts of argument making (Hample 1985, p. 17). Hample  does  not  describe  these  mental  arguments  as  themselves  the product  of  self‐arguing.  So  even  Hample’s  call  for  a  focus  on  cognitive events does not support the view that arguments are the products of acts of arguing. 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second can be inferred from the first. But the second proposi-
tion or sentence existed prior to the inferring of it from the other, 
so it cannot be the product of the act of inferring. Alternatively, 
the inference might be the expression of the form “X, so Y”. But 
the expression captures part of a description of the act of infer-
ring. Just as a painting is not the product of what it pictures, the 
expression, “X, so Y” is not a product of the act of inferring, but 
rather a partial description of the act of inferring (and if Robert 
Pinto is right, a partial description that has the power to invite 
others to engage in the same act of inferring.) Finally, the infer-
ence might just be the event that is the moving from, say, X to 
Y. But what is this event other than just the activity of inferring 
X from Y described after it has happened?  The event is not the 
product of the activity—it is the activity. So, like “argument”, 
“inference” is not subject to the process/product ambiguity, even 
if it is subject to the act/object ambiguity. 
 
 
5. The danger of the process/product distinction for argu-
mentation theory 
 
Still, someone might think something is odd about these results. 
Surely, after acts of arguing we have something we did not have 
before—surely something was produced. Undoubtedly some-
thing was produced, but there is no guarantee that the thing pro-
duced was an argument. It is quite possible that what is pro-
duced is awareness of an argument—an awareness we did not 
have before. For example, what seems common to the “act of 
arguing” case and the “giving an example” case discussed in 
section II is that in both situations, the activity of arguing and 
the activity of giving an example made the target audience 
aware of a given argument. But being made aware of an argu-
ment one was unaware of before should not be confused with 
production of that argument. 
 Surely arguments must be the product of something. Per-
haps. If arguments are sets of propositions, then perhaps argu-
ments are better described as being discovered rather than pro-
duced. Regardless, even if arguments turn out to be the sort of 
thing that is produced, there seems little reason right now to say 
that they are the product of acts of arguing. They, or the expres-
sions of them, may be the result of various acts of imagination, 
reflection, etc., but that does not make them the product of acts 
of arguing. 
 Maybe then I just have too narrow a conception of acts of 
arguing. Imagining, reflecting, reasoning, and so on are, one 
might claim, all argumentative processes out of which we gen-
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erate arguments. If by “argumentative process” we merely 
mean a process associated with or involved in arguing or argu-
ments, then or course argumentative processes are involved in 
the production of arguments (or argument expressions or acts of 
argu- 
 
ing). But to be relevant and non-trivial, we must mean by “ar-
gumentative process” processes that are themselves acts of argu-
ing. While what is covered by acts of arguing can be quite broad 
and include internal mental debates, the giving of closing argu-
ments in a trial, parliamentary debates, etc., the range is pre-
sumably not so broad as to include all acts of imagining, reflect-
ing, or reasoning. If “arguing” were construed so broadly, then 
almost every outcome of intentional human activity would be 
the product of arguing and every reasoned activity a kind of ar-
guing. There are certainly debates about what is and is not an act 
of arguing, but no argumentation theorist I know of wishes to 
claim that all reasoned activity is a kind of arguing. Given that 
we quite reasonably want, in many cases at least, to distinguish 
arguing from explaining from story-telling from bridge-building 
and so on, we should not treat all reasoned activities as arguing. 
By the same token, since these diverse activities involve the 
same sort of reflectings, imaginings, and reasonings, we should 
not claim that these mental activities are all mental arguings.  
 Perhaps, some will say, that I am merely quibbling. Yes, 
the attribution of “process” and “product” may have been ulti-
mately unfortunate, but all we really mean is that there are acts 
of arguing on the one hand and some sort of object on the other. 
Once we are clear on this, the objection goes, we can understand 
comments such as, “I will here focus on argument as process 
rather than as product” well enough.  
 Firstly, of course we can easily understand such comments 
once the clarification is made. But we should not need to make 
the clarification in the first place. If we mean acts of arguing on 
the one hand and arguments-as-objects on the other, then say 
this. All the use of the process/product locution does is make it 
seem that there is not only the acts and the objects, but that there 
is a specific relationship between the acts of arguing and the ar-
guments, when in fact there is not.  
 Secondly, if distinguishing arguments-as-acts from argu-
ments-as-objects were the only sort of use made of the proc-
ess/product distinction, then perhaps what I have done here 
might be rightly construed as quibbling. But as mentioned in the 
beginning of this paper, it is not the only use to which the dis-
tinction is put. For example, the distinction is used as part of an 
attempt to ground the difference between the so-called Logical 
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and Rhetorical perspectives. Appeal to the distinction is also 
used to justify the adequacy of definitions of ‘argument’—
certainly a core notion within argumentation theory. For exam-
ple, van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide the following defi-
nition of “argumentation”: 
 
Argumentation  is  a  verbal,  social,  and  rational  activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of  the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propo‐sitions  justifying  or  refuting  the  proposition  expressed  in the standpoint. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 1) 
 As part of the explication and justification for this definition they write “the process‐product” ambiguity of the word ‘ar‐gumentation’ is maintained:  The term argumentation refers at  the  same  time  to  the  process  of  arguing  (‘I  am  about  to complete my  argumentation’)  and  to  its  product  (‘This  ar‐gumentation  is  not  sound’).”(p.  1)  But  if  “argument”  (and “argumentation”)  is not subject  to the process/product am‐biguity,  then  judging  the  adequacy  of  definitions  of  “argu‐ment” in terms of the ambiguity is bound to lead us astray.  
 In addition, the distinction is also used to ground claims of 
priority or importance. 
Michael Gilbert, for example, takes Ralph Johnson to task for 
taking written arguments as primary, when Johnson’s own 
framework seems to indicate that the process should be primary. 
Gilbert writes:  
 
However, the object of NASTy veneration is not the process, 
but the product of the process: “At a certain point in the proc-
ess, the arguer distils elements from what has transpired and en-
codes them in the form of an argument”(159). This product is 
the distillate that is the epitome of the practice of argument. But 
this seems to indicate that the process is ontologically more 
fundamental than the product, since without the process the 
product does not come into existence.  
 It is important to realize that the exclusion of certain fac-
tors as arguments seems to rely on the distinction between the 
process of arguing and the product produced by that process. 
This is a NASTy distinction that most NICe theorists would not 
really allow. Rather, the NICe theorist will, at best, see the writ-
ten argument or speech as a snapshot of the process at a given 
moment in time, much as the inventory of a grocery store ac-
counts for its contents at some specific moment: as soon as the 
inventory is complete, it changes with the first customer. I have 
no problem at all with there being such argument products, 
though, with Willard, I believe they cannot really be understood 
independent of the process used in arriving at them. (Gilbert 
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2003, p. 6) 
 
While Gilbert, in the middle of this extended quote, seems to be 
disavowing the process/product distinction, he clearly uses the 
distinction to give ontological and intellectual priority to the  
 
process since, according to Gilbert, the argument products “can-
not really be understood independent of the process used in ar-
riving at them.” 
 But if arguments are just not the products of acts of argu-
ing, then such an argument cannot be used to ground claims of 
either ontological or intellectual primacy to the acts or process 
of arguing.  
 The debate about the primacy of various aspects of argu-
ment is not new. David Zarefsky, three decades ago, suspected, 
that “our disputes over definition turn on the question of wheth-
er argument1 or argument2 should be the primary notion 
informing our research”(Zarefsky 1980, p. 229).  Indeed, at this 
time, argument1 was tied with argument as product, and argu-
ment2 with argument as process. But even Daniel O’Keefe, who 
originally introduced argument1 and argument2 resisted this 
identification (O’Keefe 1982, p. 23).5 
Zarefsky worried that progress in argumentation theory was be-
ing thwarted by “definitional concerns [which] may distract us 
from the substantive issues we wish to investigate”(Zarefsky 
1980, p. 228). But the flipside is that failure to make progress on 
the definitional concerns may mean that worse than failing to 
make progress, we are actually producing false theories about 
the phenomena in question since we have failed to articulate 
clearly what the various phenomena in question are. This ap-
pears to be what is in danger of happening if we insist on talking 
about arguments as processes and the products of those proc-
esses, for it prejudges the relationship between the acts of argu-
ing and the things that are arguments in a way that, I hope I have 
shown, is likely to distort the real relationship between the acts 
and the objects.                                                         5 Some might suggest however that O’Keefe’s act of making an argument1 
and argument1 are the correlates for argument as process and argument as 
product. Reply: Though O’Keefe does sometimes use the unfortunate locu-
tion—the argument made by the act of making an argument, he also talks 
about the argument conveyed by the act of making an argument. Indeed, I 
suspect that what O’Keefe wants to capture by the act of making an argument 
could just as easily be described as the act of presenting or giving an argu-
ment. While the act of presenting or making or giving an argument to you 
may present or convey an argument to you, it is not the act of producing that 
argument, since it is quite likely the producer of the argument had the argu-
ment in mind before it was given or presented to you. 
Is ‘argument’ subject to the product/process ambiguity? 
 
87 
 At the same time, I am certainly not claiming that the 
arguments as objects are somehow primary. For example, if ar-
guments are groups of speech acts, then acts of arguing and ar-
guments have the same constituents, and you cannot have the 
one without the other. Also, while I have given cases where the 
arguments are temporally prior to the acts of arguing with which 
they are associated, in no way does this generate ontological or 
intellectual priority. After all, the arguments may only become a 
matter of intellectual interest after they have been made evident 
by an act of arguing. In addition, I suspect we, as theorists, want 
to have room to say that acts of arguing can go so awry, that the 
argument presented via the act of arguing is not the argument 
the author had hoped to convey. But even with some appeal to 
charity, it is clearly incumbent upon the presenter of arguments 
to argue in a way that aids rather than hinders in the presentation 
of the desired argument. Regardless, the upshot of my comments 
so far is that restricting ourselves to talk of arguments as acts on 
the one hand and objects on the other in no way supports the in-
tellectual or ontological priority of one aspect of argument over 
the other.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Despite the longstanding history of treating “argument” as if the 
arguments-as-objects are the product of the process of argu-
ments-as acts, the facts do not support this treatment. Regardless 
of one’s chosen ontology of arguments (propositions, sentences, 
utterances, statements, speech acts, or sets or groups thereof), 
either the arguments exist prior to the relevant acts of arguing or 
are constituents of those acts of arguing—they are not the prod-
ucts of those acts of arguing. If, as part of organizing the domain 
of argumentation theory, we merely want to distinguish acts of 
arguing from arguments-as-objects, we should not use the mis-
leading process/product labels to do so. At the very least such 
labels imply a relationship that does not exist and so distort our 
perceptions of the domain of study. At worst they ground false 
claims about the ontological or intellectual priority of one per-
spective of argument and argument theory over another. Without 
the distorting lens of these labels, we will be in a much better 
position to provide accurate answers to some of the fundamental 
questions of argumentation theory—what exactly are argu-
ments-as objects and how exactly are they related to acts of ar-
guing? 
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